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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2581 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
   
v. 
 
SANDERLEI ALVES DACRUZ 
a/k/a 
“Kauan” 
a/k/a 
“Kauan Santana” 
a/k/a 
“Sidney Gomes Figueredo” 
 
Sanderlei Alves Dacruz, 
                                                         Appellant  
___________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Crim. No. 12-cr-00438-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
January 21, 2014 
____________ 
 
 
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, Circuit Judges, and JONES, District Judge
1
 
 
(Filed: February 7, 2014) 
 
                                                          
1
 The Honorable C. Darnell Jones, II, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FUENTES, Circuit Judge: 
 In this appeal, Sanderlei DaCruz challenges the reasonableness and procedural 
soundness of his 51-month sentence for conspiracy to smuggle unlawful aliens contrary 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), and in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). For the 
reasons set forth below, we affirm. 
I. 
 On June 5, 2009, DaCruz, a Brazilian national, pleaded guilty in the Western 
District of Texas to illegal reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). On July 23, 2009, 
DaCruz was sentenced to time-served of 73 days,
2
 followed by one year of supervised 
release. The judgment was entered on July 31, 2009. DaCruz was removed to Brazil on 
September 10, 2009. His term of supervised release expired on July 31, 2010. 
 In regard to this case, DaCruz was arrested on June 10, 2011. On December 19, 
2012, he pleaded guilty, following a plea agreement, to conspiracy to smuggle unlawful 
aliens, contrary to 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(A)(i), and in violation of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324(a)(1)(A)(v)(I). At his sentencing, DaCruz admitted to having been involved in the 
conspiracy relating to these charges since at least the end of 2009. The plea agreement 
stipulated that the total offense level was 22. Part of the calculation of the total offense 
                                                          
2
 The government argues that DaCruz’s prior sentence of imprisonment amounted to 86 
days. Because the specific number of days is irrelevant to the disposition of this matter, 
we will assume the facts in the light most favorable to DaCruz.  
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level in the plea agreement imposed a 2-point increase under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(3)(A) 
because DaCruz “committed … part of the instant offense after sustaining . . . a 
conviction for a felony immigration and naturalization offense.” Id.; see App. at 28; the 
offense that triggered this increase was DaCruz’s 2009 conviction for illegal reentry. The 
parties agreed not to seek or argue for any departure, adjustment, or variance not set forth 
in the plea agreement, and they agreed that “a sentence within the Guidelines range that 
results from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 22 is reasonable.” App. at 29. As 
part of the agreement, DaCruz “voluntarily waive[d][] the right to file any appeal . . . 
which challenges the reasonableness of a sentence imposed by the sentencing court if that 
sentence falls within or below the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total 
Guidelines offense level of 22.” Id. 
 The District Court calculated DaCruz’s criminal history category to be III based 
on two provisions of the Guidelines. It imposed 2 points pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) 
because DaCruz “committed the instant offense while under . . . supervised release . . .,” 
id.,  and assigned 2 points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1.(b) because DaCruz served “a prior 
sentence of imprisonment of at least sixty days,” id. The supervised release, as well as the 
term of imprisonment, stemmed from DaCruz’s 2009 conviction discussed above. These 
four points convert to a criminal history category of III. 
 Despite the plea agreement, DaCruz argued for a downward departure under 
§ 4A1.3(b)(1), which states that “[i]f reliable information indicates that the criminal 
history category substantially overrepresents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal 
history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward 
 4 
 
departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G.§ 4A1.3(b)(1). The District Court addressed and 
denied DaCruz’s request for a downward departure on the merits. 
 Combining a criminal history category of III and a total offense level of 22, the 
District Court calculated DaCruz’s advisory Guidelines range as 51-63 months. After 
hearing DaCruz’s arguments as to the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the 
District Court imposed a sentence of 51 months imprisonment. 
II. 
 DaCruz presents three arguments on appeal. First, on the procedural front, he 
argues that the calculation of his criminal history category as III was improper. Second, 
he argues that the District Court erred in denying his request for a downward departure. 
Finally, he argues that the District Court’s imposition of sentence was substantively 
unreasonable. We will address these arguments in turn.  
 A. Calculation of DaCruz’s criminal history category 
 DaCruz raises essentially three arguments that his criminal history was incorrectly 
calculated. None have merit.  
 First, he argues that the District Court should not have added two points under 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b) because this overstated his criminal history category. 
Section 4A1.1(b) states “[a]dd 2 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment of at 
least sixty days . . .” In this case, the District Court added 2 points for DaCruz’s 
conviction for illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), for which DaCruz served 73 days 
in custody. Because DaCruz’s time of imprisonment was close to 60 days, he argues that 
this guideline should not have applied. This is incorrect. Section § 4A1.1(b) does not 
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allow the court discretion not to apply these points, and District Courts “‘must continue 
to calculate a defendant’s Guidelines sentence precisely as they would have before 
Booker.’” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 608 (3d Cir. 2008) (en banc) (quoting 
United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 Next, DaCruz argues that 2 points should not have been added under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.1(d), which says, “[a]dd 2 points if the defendant committed the instant offense 
while under any criminal justice sentence, including . . . supervised release.” Id. DaCruz 
argues that he was not on supervised release at the time he committed this offense 
because he was not being supervised by probation for his earlier offense when his offense 
conduct for this case occurred. 
 Whether DaCruz was being actively supervised at the time of the offense conduct 
related to this case is irrelevant: the application notes of U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(d) say that 
“active supervision is not required for this subsection to apply.” Id., Application Note 4. 
DaCruz’s period of supervised release lasted until July 31, 2010, because removal does 
not automatically extinguish supervised release. United States v. Williams, 369 F.3d 250, 
253 (3d Cir. 2004). In fact, we have before decided that it is not within the District 
Court’s discretion to toll a period of supervised release following removal. United States 
v. Cole, 567 F.3d 110, 116 (3d Cir. 2009). Because DaCruz admitted to involvement in 
the conspiracy in late 2009, and because his supervised release term ran from July 31, 
2009 to July 31, 2010, at least part of his offense conduct admittedly occurred while he 
was on supervised release.  
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 DaCruz’s final argument is that it was impermissible triple counting for the 
District Court to add 2 points under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.1(b) and 2 points under U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.1(d), on top of the 2 points added to his total offense level under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2L1.1(b)(3)(A) pursuant to the plea agreement. His argument is premised on the notion 
that, since all three of these Guidelines provisions are meant to punish repeat offenders, 
and since each set of points related to the same 2009 conviction, it was impermissible to 
calculate the criminal history in this fashion. The argument is meritless. As for the 
interaction between U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(3)(A) and § 4A1.1(b), the application notes to 
§ 2L1.1 indicate that, “Prior felony conviction(s) resulting in an adjustment under 
subsection (b)(3) are also counted for purposes of determining criminal history points 
pursuant to Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal History).” U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1, Application 
Note 4. DaCruz does not explain how adding points for committing this crime while on 
supervised release under § 4A1.1(d) conflicts with the other two provisions.   
 In sum, the District Court correctly calculated DaCruz’s criminal history category 
at III.  
 B. Downward Departure 
 DaCruz also argues that the District Court erred by failing to depart downward 
pursuant to § 4A1.3(b)(1). Specifically, he argues that the criminal history category of III 
overstated the seriousness of his prior offense because he only spent a short time over 60 
days in prison. In the plea agreement, DaCruz waived arguments regarding any 
downward departures not specified in the agreement. This departure was not in the 
agreement. Nevertheless, the District Court addressed his motion for a downward 
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departure, and denied it. Because we lack appellate “jurisdiction to review discretionary 
decisions by district courts not to depart downward,” United States v. Vargas, 477 F.3d 
94, 103 (3d Cir. 2007), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Arrelucea-
Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2009), this argument must fail.  
 C. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
DaCruz argues that the District Court erred in its analysis of the 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) factors resulting in a sentence that was substantively unreasonable. 
Specifically, he contends that the District Court failed to avoid unnecessary sentencing 
disparities. The government responds that, as part of the plea agreement, DaCruz agreed 
that “a sentence within the Guidelines range that results from the agreed total Guidelines 
offense level of 22 is reasonable.” App. at 29. Moreover, DaCruz “voluntarily waive[d][] 
the right to file any appeal . . . which challenges the reasonableness of a sentence 
imposed by the sentencing court if that sentence falls within or below the Guidelines 
range that results from the agreed total Guidelines offense level of 22.” Id. A criminal 
history category of III and a total offense level, as stipulated, of 22, results in a 
Guidelines range of 51-63 months, and the District Court imposed a sentence of 51 
months, within that Guidelines range. Accordingly, DaCruz received a sentence within 
the terms of the plea agreement. Because DaCruz has offered no argument as to why we 
should not enforce the waiver provision of his plea agreement, we also lack jurisdiction 
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to consider the merits of his appeal on this ground. See United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 
557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001).
3
 
 
III. 
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of sentence of 51 months 
imposed by the District Court.  
                                                          
3
 “Khattak received a sentence well within the terms of his plea agreement. To avoid 
dismissal of appeal, Defendant must show why we should not enforce the waiver 
provision of the plea agreement. Khattak presents no set of circumstances that would 
make his waiver unknowing or involuntary. . . .We will enforce Khattak’s waiver of his 
right to appeal. Therefore, we have no jurisdiction to consider the merits of his appeal of 
the denial of the minor-role adjustment.”  Khattak , 273 F.3d at 563 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).  
 
